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The vast majority of the world’s poorest households depend on farming for their livelihood. 
In Latin America, because of higher levels of developments, the larger share of the non-farm 
sector, more urbanization and greater land concentration than in Africa and Asia, poverty 
tends to be less-heavily concentrated in rural areas, but it is nonetheless prevalent enough to 
be a concern. In the past farm earnings were often depressed by pro-urban and anti-
agricultural biases of their own country’s policies. True, progress has been made over the past 
two decades by numerous developing countries in reducing those policy biases, but many 
trade-reducing price distortions remain between sectors as well as within the agricultural 
sector of low- and middle-income countries, including in Latin America.  
This study is part of a global research project seeking to understand the extent and 
effects of the reduction in policy biases, and the reasons behind the reforms in Asia, Africa, 
Europe’s transition economies as well as in Latin American and the Caribbean.
1 That is, the 
first main purpose is to obtain quantitative indicators of past and recent policy interventions. 
The second is to understand better the political economy of distortions to agricultural 
incentives in different national settings. With that better understanding, the study’s third 
purpose is to explore prospects for further reducing distortions to agricultural incentives and 
likely implications for agricultural competitiveness and trade of the different Latin American 
countries. 
Thus a core element of the project is compiling new annual time series estimates of 
protection/taxation over the past half century. These are used to help address such questions 
as the following: Where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what 
extent has there been ‘overshooting’ in the sense that some developing country food 
                                                 
1 The other three regional studies are Anderson and Martin (2008), Anderson and Masters (2008) and Anderson 
and Swinnen (2008). They, together with comparable studies of high-income countries, form the basis for a 





producers are now being protected from import competition, following the examples of 
earlier-industrializing Europe and Northeast Asia. What are the political economy forces 
behind the more-successful reformers, and how do they compare with those in less-successful 
countries where distortions to agricultural incentives remain? How important have been 
domestic political forces in bringing about reform during the past two decades, relative to 
international forces (such as loan conditionality, GATT rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations, regional integration agreements, WTO accession, and globalization of 
supermarkets and other firms along the value chain), compared with the forces operating in 
earlier decades? What explains the pattern of distortions within each country’s agricultural 
sector? What policy lessons and trade implications can be drawn for these and less-
developed/still-distorted countries from those differing experiences, with a view to ensuring 
better growth-enhancing and poverty reducing outcomes from own-country reforms in the 
future, including less ‘over-shooting’ to a protectionist regime?  
Now is especially timely for such a study as countries seek to achieve their UN-
encouraged Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and to position themselves in 
preferential and multilateral trade negotiations in the wake of other forces of globalization 
such as the information, communication and agricultural bio-technology revolutions.  
This Latin American study is based on a sample of eight countries, comprising the 
Dominican Republic as the largest Caribbean economy, Nicaragua as the poorest country in 
Central America, Colombia and Ecuador as two of the poorest South America tropical 
countries, and the big four economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Together these 
countries in 2000-04 accounted for 78 percent of the region’s population, 80 percent of its 
agricultural value added, and 84 percent of total GDP in Latin America.  
Key characteristics of those economies – which account for only 4.5 percent of global 
GDP but 7.7 percent of agricultural value added and more than 10 percent of agricultural and 
food exports – are shown in Table 1.1. They reveal the considerable diversity within the 
region in terms of stages of development, relative resource endowments, comparative 
advantages and hence trade specialization, and in the incidence poverty and income 
inequality. This makes the set of countries chosen a rich sample for comparative study. 
Nicaragua’s per capita income is only one-seventh the global average and those for Ecuador 
and Colombia are only one-third, while Argentina’s and Chile’s are one-eighth below and 
Mexico’s is one-eighth above the global average. Only Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua have 





Republic and Ecuador have well below the global average, and Chile, Colombia and Mexico 
are a little less that one-third above the average. Income inequality is high throughout the 
region compared with the rest of the world, with the Gini coefficient being near or above 0.5, 
and averaging 0.52. This is well above that for Asia and Africa. Likewise the Gini coefficient 
for land is very high in Latin America: 0.58 for Chile but above 0.7 for Argentina, Brazil, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua compared with an average of less than 0.5 in Asia (World Bank 2007, 
Table A4). Even so, there is comparatively little absolute poverty except in the poorest 
tropical parts of the region. 
Despite having nearly twice as much agricultural land per capita as the rest of the 
world, Latin American agriculture can be characterized by concentrated land ownership and a 
structure of production where commercial medium and large farms contribute the bulk of 
agricultural output. It is also a region with a high degree of urbanization. These features are 
important for understanding the forces behind agricultural policies. So too is the fact that, 
until a few years ago, most countries in the region experienced a high degree of 
macroeconomic instability and high inflation. The manipulation of food prices for urban 
consumers, in an attempt to reduce inflation, was (and still is in Argentina) a dominant 
feature driving farm price policy. 
Most Latin American countries went through a process of major economy-wide 
policy reforms, beginning for some countries approximately in the mid-1980s (or the 1970s 
for Chile) and for others in the mid-1990s. Reforms centered on macroeconomic stabilization, 
trade liberalization, deregulation, and some privatization of state agencies. There was a 
considerable reassessment of the role of the government in guiding economic development. 
Agricultural policies were an integral part of this reform process, although not the principle 
motivation of the reforms.  
This chapter begins with a brief summary first of economic growth and structural 
changes in the region since the 1960s, and then of agricultural and other economic policies as 
they affected agriculture before and after the reforms of the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. It then 
introduces the methodology used by country authors to estimate the nominal and relative 
rates of assistance to farmers delivered by national farm and non-farm policies over the past 
several decades (depending on data availability), as well as the impact of those policies on 
prices of farm products for consumers. Both farmer assistance and consumer taxation will be 
negative in periods where there is an anti-agricultural, pro-urban consumer bias in a country’s 
policy regime. A synopsis of the empirical results detailed in the country chapters to follow is 







Growth and structural changes  
 
 
Before examining policy changes, it is helpful to review the economic growth and 
intersectoral changes that have taken place in Latin America’s economies over the past few 
decades. Since 1980 the region’s real GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 5.4 
percent, or 3.6 percent per capita. These rates are somewhat above the averages for other 
developing countries of 4.1 percent total and 2.3 percent per capita, but somewhat below 
Asia’s averages of 7.1 percent total and 5.5 percent per capita. The region’s comparative 
growth performance was much less rosey in the 1960s and 1970s, however, before the region 
moved away from an import-substituting industrialization regime.  
  Among the focus countries of the present study, Chile and Mexico have been the star 
performers since 1980, while Ecuador and Nicaragua have been the slowest growers. 
(Nicaragua’s civil conflict sent its economy backwards in the 1980s but it grew twice as fast 
as Ecuador in the 1990s.)  
  The industrial sector grew much slower than overall GDP during the past 25 years, 
but agriculture grew even slower, at barely half the rate of the rest of the economy, as the 
service sector took the lead. Within our sample countries, the economies of Chile and Mexico 
were the fastest growing and Ecuador’s and Argentina’s the slowest – apart from Nicaragua, 
which was disrupted by a prolonged civil conflict during the 1980s (Table 1.2). 
  As a result of that strong growth in service activities, the services share of GDP rose 
during the past two decades from barely one-half to two-thirds, while agriculture’s share fell 
from 9 to 6 percent on average in our sample economies. The relative decline of agriculture 
has been slowest in Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua and fastest in oil-exporting Ecuador and 
Mexico and also in Chile. By 2000-04, agriculture’s GDP share ranged from 4 percent in 
Chile and Mexico to twice than in Brazil and Ecuador, three times that in Colombia and the 
Dominican Republic, and more than four times that in Nicaragua (Table 1.3).  
The shares of overall employment accounted for by farming activities have fallen 





always consistent with national data because of definitional differences). Those shares remain 
at much higher levels than the GDP shares, implying relatively low and slow-growing labor 
productivity on farms. The fastest decline has been in Brazil, where the employment share in 
agriculture has fallen from one-half to less than one-sixth during the past 40 years (Table 
1.4). 
Agriculture’s share of exports also has declined, on average by about one-third each 
decade since the latter 1960s. The only exception is Chile, whose share has risen dramatically 
from one-eighth to one-third over that period. Chile contrasts markedly with the other fast-
growing economy in our sample, Mexico, where the share of farm products in all goods 
exports has fallen from 58 percent to just 6 percent (Table 1.5). The declining relative 
importance of farm exports has been faster in Latin America than in the rest of the world: its 
index of ‘revealed’ comparative advantage in these products (defined as agriculture and 
processed food’s share of national exports as a ratio of their share of global merchandise 
exports) has fallen by about one-third since the 1960s, as has its index of trade specialization 
(defined as net exports as a ratio of the sum of imports and exports of farm products). Note, 
however, that during the past decade there has been a marked upturn in those two indexes not 
only in Chile but in several other reforming Latin American countries, including Argentina 
and Brazil. The indexes are now at very high levels in all countries in the sample apart from 
Mexico, which is the only one with a revealed comparative disadvantage in agriculture (Table 
1.6). 
Finally before examining the region’s policy reforms, note the increases in export 
orientation in the region. A common indicator is the value of goods and services expressed as 
a percentage of GDP. Since the early 1990s, that indicator has roughly doubled for the three 
biggest economies (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) but it has changed little for the others in 
our sample apart from Chile where it rose a few years earlier (Table 1.7). Another indicator, 
reported in Table 1.8, is the share of primary agricultural production that is exported. That 
has jumped dramatically in the past 20 years – including in Mexico where it is now over 30 
percent, as a result of sharply increased specialization within the sector following the 
agricultural and trade policy reforms began in anticipation of the NAFTA agreements 
formalized in 1994. It is important to note, though, that import dependence also has grown as 
a consequence of trade specialization (Table 1.8b). Indeed, 17 of the region’s 21 countries for 





countries in our sample, even though all but Mexico are more than 100 percent self sufficient 
in agricultural products as an aggregate (Table 1.8c), and their share of global exports of 
agriculture and food has jumped from 6.8 to 9.6 percent between 1990-94 and 2000-04,
2 only 
Argentina was a net exporter of cereals during 2003-05 (World Bank 2007, Table A4). This 
is important in the politics of food import policymaking.  
 
 
Evolution of agricultural and trade policies 
 
 
Like most other regions, Latin America has a diverse range of policies and political structures 
and institutions, but there was to some extent a common evolution from the 1960s in the 
ideology motivating economic policies.  
 
Prior to the reforms of the mid-1980s/early 1990s 
 
Until approximately the mid-1980s, agricultural price interventions were largely a byproduct 
of a development strategy claiming the best way to grow was by adopting a protectionist 
policy that encouraged import-substituting industrialization. That policy also raised budgetary 
resources in the form of import tax revenue, which were supplemented in some countries 
(such as Argentina) by agricultural export taxes. Both sets of policies harmed the region’s 
most competitive farmers, and were offset only slightly by farm credit and fertilizer 
subsidies. 
Between the1950s and the 1980s there were concerns about high rates of inflation, 
especially where the urban populations had a strong political influence. Policy makers were 
under pressure to avoid large increases in food prices, which would potentially impact wage 
rates and thereby (according to then prevailing theory) accelerate inflation through the so-
called “cost push” effect.  
In addition to fiscal and inflation objectives that made farm export taxes attractive, 
there was a widespread belief in the 1950s and 1960s by policy makers and followers of the 
“structuralist school” associated with Prebisch (1950, 1959, 1964) –notwithstanding the 
                                                 
2 The biggest increases in the shares of global exports of agriculture and food between 1990-94 and 2000-04 
were for Argentina (jumped from 1.6  to 2.2 percent), Brazil (2.3 to 3.4 percent), Chile (0.7 to 1.2 percent) 
Dominican Republic (0.13 to 0.4 percent) and Mexico (1.0 to 1.5 percent) – see Sandri, Valenzuela and 





seminar book by Schultz (1964) – that efficiency losses from extracting rents from 
agriculture were low, and that their main impact would be to reduce land rents and values. 
Argentina is a prime example of where the view persisted that farmers in Latin America were 
unresponsive to price incentives. While the belief of farmer unresponsiveness to incentive has 
largely disappeared now, a few countries –Argentina is one – still tax agricultural exports for 
fiscal revenues and to lower consumer food prices.  
An empirical study of agricultural pricing policies led by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 
(1991) included five Latin American countries for the period 1960-1984. Its main findings 
are fourfold. First, over the period examined and farm products selected, direct interventions 
affecting importables were positive on average while those on exportables were negative. 
Second, aggregating over all selected products, the net effect was negative, indicating that the 
direct tax on exportables dominated protection on importables. Third, the rate of indirect 
taxation on agriculture (due to industrial protection policy and overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate) was large, and dominated the rate of direct taxation. Fourth, direct price 
policies stabilized agricultural prices relative to world prices while indirect policies 
contributed little if anything to food price stability. The study found direct protection to 
agricultural importables averaged 13 percent, and for exportables amounted to –6 percent. 
The indirect taxation rate in the region averaged 21 percent, so the total taxation rate (direct 
and indirect) averaged 28 percent. The highest direct taxation was found in Argentina and the 
Dominican Republic (about 18 percent). As a percent of agricultural GDP, net income 
transfers out of agriculture (direct and indirect) reached 84 percent in Argentina, 56 percent 
in Chile, 43 percent in the Dominican Republic and 42 percent in Colombia.  
 
Economic reforms from the mid-1980s/early 1990s 
 
By the1980s there was disillusionment with the results of the import substitution strategy, and 
wider acceptance of theoretical developments regarding the causes of inflation and 
macroeconomic instability in general. A macroeconomic framework designed for open 
economies gradually displaced during the 1980s and early 1990s the closed economy 
approach in most Latn American countries. Governments introduced economy-wide reforms 
with special emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation, unilateral trade 
liberalization and privatization.  
The goal of the reformers was to create a better climate for productivity and private 





the major change in trade policy was the partial or total removal of most quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports, the elimination of export taxes, and a program of gradual 
reduction in the levels of import tariffs. This yielded incentives to move resources from 
import-competing to export-oriented sectors, including in agriculture, which enhanced 
competitiveness and led to greater integration with the world economy.  
By the mid-1990s the exchange rate was recognized as the most important “price” 
affecting the agricultural economy. At the outset of the reforms, it was expected that trade 
liberalization and the reduction of the fiscal deficit would lead to a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 1988). Yet the reforms were followed by a 
significant appreciation of the currency associated with the opening of the capital account, 
greater inward foreign investment, and a major increase in domestic real interest rates. 
Reforms in the service sector also played a critical role. Deregulation and privatization had a 
major impact on the availability in the marketplace of more-reliable and lower-cost services 
used in agriculture such as ports, airlines and shipping transport.  
The timing of reforms differed somewhat across countries. Colombia, for example, 
became a more open economy with export promotion from 1967, adopted a more ambitious 
trade liberalization in 1990 and then went into a policy reform reversal from 1992. In Chile, 
controlled markets during 1950 to 1974 were followed by radical economic reforms towards 
trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization between 1978 and 1982 before a second 
phase of reforms began in 1984. Mexico introduced strong policy changes starting in the mid-
1980s, before NAFTA, and involving more openness, deregulation and privatization, a 
reduction of credit subsidies and major changes in the role of government in marketing of 
farm products.   
A wide variety of policy instruments have been applied to influence agricultural 
prices, even during the post-reform period. Colombia, for example, has had minimum support 
prices in addition to import tariffs, price compensation schemes, procurement agreements, a 
monopoly on grain imports by a government agency, export licenses and subsidies, 
safeguards on imports, and until 1990 all imports of inputs were subject to prior import 
licenses. Then tariffs and tariff surcharges associated with price bands on more than 100 
products were introduced in 1995. Mexico is another leader on interventions, including in the 
transition from highly government-controlled markets before the mid-1980s to more market-
oriented policies. Its policies include price support programs (before the mid-1980s in 
conjunction with state trading), credit subsidies and input subsidies, and direct income 





exportables that are also wage goods have been subjected to export taxes, complemented in 
some years with export bans.  
To capture the net effect of these various interventions on farmer and consumer 
incentives, a common methodology was adopted by the authors of the country case studies in 
this volume. A summary follows, and further details can be found in Anderson et al. (2008) 
which is reproduced as Appendix 1 in this book. 
 
 
Methodology for measuring rates of assistance/taxation 
 
 
The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is defined as the percentage by which government 
policies have raised gross returns to producers above what they would be without the 
government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0). If a trade measure is the sole source 
of government intervention, then the measured NRA will also be the consumer tax equivalent 
(CTE) rate at that same point in the value chain.  
There are several purposes for which NRAs and CTEs can be used, and they affect the 
choice of methodology. This project seeks to achieve three purposes. One is to generate a 
comparable set of number across a wide range of countries and over a long time period, so 
the methodology needs to be both simple and somewhat flexible. Another purpose is to 
provide a single number to indicate the total extent of transfer to (or from) farmers due to 
agricultural policies – the NRA; and another number for the extent of transfer to (or from) 
consumers – the CTE. Both are expressed either as a percentage or in dollar terms. This is 
what the OECD’s PSE and CSE do, both of which can be negative when transfers from 
exceed transfers to the relevant group. This research project’s agricultural NRA and CTE are 
similar to the OECD’s PSE and CSE but with some important differences outlined below. 
And the third purpose is to enable economic modelers to use the NRAs for individual primary 
and lightly processed agricultural products as producer price wedges, and the CTEs as 
consumer price wedges, in single-sector, multi-sector and economy-wide policy simulation 
models by allocating those wedges to particular policy instruments such as trade taxes or 
domestic subsidies. 
The NRAs are based on estimates of assistance to individual industries. Great care has 
gone into generating the NRA for each covered agricultural industry, particularly in countries 





competition, and markets for foreign currency have been highly distorted at various times and 
to varying degrees in the past.  
Most distortions to industries producing tradables come from trade measures, such as 
a tariff imposed on the cif import price or an export subsidy or tax imposed on the fob price 
at the country’s border. Since an ad valorem tariff or export subsidy is the equivalent of a 
production subsidy and a consumption tax expressed as a percentage of the border price, it is 
that which is captured in the NRA and CTE at the point in the value chain where the product 
is first traded. To get the NRA for the farmer, authors of the country studies estimated or 
guessed the extent of pass-through back to the farm gate. Note that the NRA differs from the 
OECD’s PSE in that the latter is expressed as a percentage of the distorted price and hence 
will be lower than the NRA which is expressed as a percentage of the undistorted price.  
We decided against seeking estimates of the more complex effective rate of assistance 
(ERA) even though it is, in principle, a better partial equilibrium single measure of distortions 
to producer incentives than the nominal rate. The reason is that to do so requires knowing 
each product’s value added share of output. Such data are not available for most developing 
countries even every few years, let alone for every year in the long time series that is the 
focus of this study.
3 And in most countries distortions to farm inputs are very small compared 
with distortions to farm output prices. But where there are significant product-specific 
distortions to input costs, they are captured by estimating their equivalence in terms of a 
higher output price and including that in the NRA for individual agricultural industries 
wherever data allow. Any non-product-specific distortions to farm input prices are also added 
into the estimate for the overall sectoral NRA for agriculture as a whole. 
The targeted degree of coverage of products for which agricultural NRA estimates are 
generated was 70 percent, based on the gross value of farm production at undistorted prices. 
This degree of coverage is similar to the OECD’s PSE coverage. Unlike the OECD, however, 
this project did not assume that the nominal assistance for covered products would apply 
equally to non-covered farm products. This is because in developing countries the 
agricultural policies affecting the non-covered products are often very different from those 
for covered products. For example, nontradables among non-covered farm goods (often 
highly perishable or low-valued products relative to their transport cost) are often not subject 
to direct distortionary policies. The authors of the country case studies were asked to provide 
three sets of ‘guesstimates’ of the NRAs for non-covered farm products, one each for the 
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import-competing, exportable and nontradable sub-sectors. A weighted average for all 
agricultural products is then generated, using the gross values of production at unassisted 
prices as weights. For countries that also provide non-product-specific agricultural subsidies 
or taxes (assumed to be shared on a pro-rata basis between tradables and nontradables), such 
net subsidies are then added to product-specific assistance to get a NRA for total agriculture, 
and also for tradable agriculture for use in generating the Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA, 
defined below).   
How best to present regional aggregate NRA and RRA estimates depends on the 
purpose for which the averages are required. We generate a weighted average NRA for 
covered products for each country, because only then can we add theNRAfor non-covered 
products to get the NRA for all agriculture. When it comes to averaging across countries, 
each polity is an observation of interest, so a simple average is meaningful for the purpose of 
political economy analysis. But if one wants a sense of how distorted is agriculture in a whole 
region, a weighted average is needed. The weighted average NRA for covered primary 
agriculture can be generated by multiplying each primary industry’s share of the gross value 
of production (valued at the farm-gate equivalent undistorted prices) by its 
corresponding NRA and adding across industries.
4 The overall sectoral rate, which we 
denoteNRAag , can be obtained by adding also the actual or assumed information for the 
non-covered farm commodities and, where it exists, the aggregate value of non-product-
specific assistance to agriculture. 
A weighted average can be similarly generated for the tradables part of agriculture – 
including those industries producing products such as milk and sugar that require only light 
processing before they can be traded – by assuming that its share of non-product-specific 
assistance equals its weight in the total. Call that
t NRAag .  
In addition to the mean, it is important to provide also a measure of the dispersion or 
variability of the NRA estimates across the covered products. The cost of government policy 
distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend to be greater the greater the 
degree of substitution in production (Lloyd 1974). In the case of agriculture which involves 
the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm activities, the greater 
                                                 
4 Corden (1971) proposed that free-trade volume be used as weights, but since they are not observable (and an 
economy-wide model is needed to estimate them) the common practice is to compromise by using actual 
distorted volumes but undistorted unit values or, equivalently, distorted values divided by (1+ NRA). If estimates 
of own-and cross-price elasticities of demand and supply are available, a partial equilibrium estimate of the 
quantity at undistorted could be generated, but if those estimated elasticities are unreliable this may introduce 





the variation of  NRAs  across industries within the sector then the higher will be the welfare 
cost of those market interventions. A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard deviation 
of the covered industries’ NRAs.  
Each industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, 
or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so that it is 
possible to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of 
tradables. Those NRAs are used to generate a trade bias index, TBI, defined in percentage 
terms as: 
(2)    TBI = 100[(1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1] 
where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and 
exportables parts of the agricultural sector. The TBI indicates in a single number the extent to 
which the typically anti-trade bias (negative TBI) in agricultural policies changes over time.  
Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own outputs but also, albeit indirectly 
via changes to factor market prices and the exchange rate, by the incentives nonagricultural 
producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance 
that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his 
Symmetry Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has a similar 
effect on the export sector as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a 
third sector producing only nontradables, to a model with imperfect competition, and 
regardless of the economy’s size (Vousden 1990, pp. 46-47). If one assumes that there are no 
distortions in the markets for nontradables and that the value shares of agricultural and non-
agricultural nontradable products remain constant, then the economy-wide effect of 
distortions to agricultural incentives can be captured by the extent to which the tradable parts 
of agricultural production are assisted or taxed relative to producers of other tradables. By 
generating estimates of the average NRA for non-agricultural tradables, it is then possible to 
calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA, defined in percentage terms as: 
(1)    RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1] 
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the tradable 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA cannot be 
less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA. And if both of 
those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if it is below 
(above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which a 





In calculating the NRA for producers of agricultural and non-agricultural tradables, 
the methodology outlined in Appendix 1 sought to include distortions generated by dual or 
multiple exchange rates. Such direct interventions in the market for foreign currency were 
common in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, but not since the reforms. However, most 
authors of the focus country studies had difficulty finding an appropriate estimate of the 
extent of that distortion, so the impact of that on NRAs has not been included for all but 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Nicaragua. Its exclusion for the other five countries means 
their estimated (typically) positive NRAs for importables and (typically) negative NRAs for 
exportables are smaller than they should be. In cases where the NRA for importables 
dominates that for exportables, this omission would lead to an underestimate of the average 
(positive) NRA for such tradables sectors. That applies to non-agricultural sectors for all the 
countries studied in this book. In the most common cases in earlier decedes where for the 
farm sector the estimated NRA for importables is dominated by a negative NRA for 
exportables, the estimate of the sectoral average NRA for agriculture would be less negative 
than it should be, and hence so too would be the RRA estimate.
5 
To obtain dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation, Valenzuela, 
Croser and Anderson (2008) have taken the country authors’ estimates of  NRA and 
multiplied them by the gross value of production at undistorted prices to obtain an estimate in 
current US dollars of the direct gross subsidy equivalent of assistance to farmers (GSE). This 
is then added up across products for a country and across countries for any or all products to 
get regional aggregate transfer estimates for the studied countries. An aggregate estimate for 
the rest of the region is obtained assuming the weighted average NRA for non-studied 
countries is the same as the weighted average NRA for the studied countries, and that the non-
studied countries’ share of the region’s gross value of farm production at undistorted prices 
each year is the same as its share of the region’s agricultural GDP measured at distorted 
prices. These GSE values are also expressed on per-farm-worker basis. 
  To obtain comparable dollar value estimates of the consumer transfer, the CTE
 
estimate at the point at which a product is first traded is multiplied by consumption (obtained 
from the FAO’s supply and utilization database) valued at undistorted prices to obtain an 
estimate in current US dollars of the tax equivalent to consumers of primary farm products 
                                                 
5 Other reasons for exchange rate misalignment are discussed in some country studies, but they are not 
quantified. Several country studies document the high instability of real exchange rates, which have important 
influences on the relative profitability of tradables versus nontradable products. Furthermore in some countries, 
Brazil in particular, high instability of the nominal exchange rate, due to short-term speculative trading and 
political uncertainties, can influence producer incentives but, for the purposes of this project and the reasons 





(TEC). This too is added up across products for a country, and across countries for any or all 
products, to get regional aggregate transfer estimates for the studied countries. These TEC 
values are also expressed on per capita basis. 
 
 
Estimates of Latin American policy indicators  
 
 
We begin with the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, then compare that with the 
nominal rate for non-agriculture, and then express it in terms of dollar equivalents of 
assistance/taxation to farmers and of taxation or subsidy to food consumers. 
 
Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture 
 
On average (whether simple or weighted), agricultural price and trade policies in Latin 
America reduced farmers earnings throughout the post-war period right through to the 1980s. 
The extent (when expressed as a nominal tax equivalent) peaked at more than 20 percent in 
the 1970s, but was still close to 10 percent in the latter 1980s. The only countries in our 
sample that received positive assistance from farm policies during that period were Chile and 
(at least from the late 1970s but only to a minor extent) Mexico. Each of Argentina, Brazil, 
Dominican Republic and Ecuador had negative rates of assistance that averaged well above 
20 percent for at least one 5-year sub-period, and apart from Dominican Republic each had a 
negative NRA average even for the 1990s, as did Nicaragua. However, by the mid-1990s 
Brazil and Dominican Republic had joined Chile and Colombia in having a positive NRA 
average. Meanwhile, Mexico had raised its assistance considerably before engaging in reform 
following negotiations to join the WTO and NAFTA; and Argentina had all but eliminated its 
discrimination against its exporters in the 1990s, only to reinstate explicit export taxes again 
from late 2001 when it abandoned its fixed exchange rate with the US dollar and nominally 
devalued by two-thirds. The average NRAag for the region in the 1990s and first half of the 
present decade averaged just under 5 percent (Table 1.9). Its switch from negative to positive 
occurred in 1992 (Appendix 2, Table A2.9b). 
  The effect of the policy reforms on NRAs over the past two decades is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1: for all but Chile the national average NRA is less negative or more positive in 





region, although there are several (e.g., milk and poultry) that have seen their assistance cut. 
That pattern can be seen from Figure 1.2, which also illustrates the diversity of the region’s 
average rates across commodities. 
  There is also a great deal of diversity across commodities within each country’s farm 
sector, and the extent of that diversity (as measured by the standard deviation) has diminished 
on average by only about one-quarter during 1990-2004 compared with the pre-reform period 
of 1965-89. This is evident in Table 1.10, which reports the standard deviation of NRAs for 
covered products (which account for more than two-thirds of the value of agricultural 
production). It means that there is still a great deal that could be gained in terms of improved 
resource reallocation within the agricultural sector if differences in rates of assistance for 
different industries were to be reduced. 
  One striking feature of the distortion pattern within the farm sector is its strong anti-
trade bias. This is shown for agriculture’s import-competing and export sub-sectors for the 
region in Figure 1.3 and for each country in Table 1.12 along with the trade bias index. Those 
estimates reveal that there has been little dimunition in that bias over the past four decades 
except in Brazil. Indeed the average NRA for exportable farm products has been negative 
throughout virtually the whole period analyzed for all but Chile (and Brazil in the past decade 
and Colombia this present decade), while the regional average NRA for import-competing 
farm industries has increased from virtually zero in the 1970s to20+ percent in the period 
since 1990. That is, the region’s anti-trade bias persists despite the lower taxation of farm 
export industries because the average NRA for import-competing farm products has been 
rising in recent times for several of our studied countries (Table 1.12). 
The contributions to the overall NRA for agriculture from covered products, from 
non-covered products, and from non-product-specific assistance for the region as a whole are 
summarized in Table 1.11. Non-product-specific assistance added only one or two percentage 
points during the past four decades. Input price distortions also contributed little on average 
to the overall regional NRA for agriculture, reducing its negative value slightly in the 1980s 
and adding slightly to its positive value during the past decade or so (Figure 1.4). Chile was a 
case where input distortions reduced the positive NRA for the farm sector, due to protection 
policies raising the price of imported or import-competing farm inputs. That has also been the 
case in Argentina since the early 1990s, and to a smaller extent in Colombia since the 1960s. 
There is also very little in the way of domestic producer subsidies/taxes on average in the 
region, the main exception being positive support measures in Mexico and slightly negative 





The dollar value of the positive or negative assistance to farmers due to agricultural 
price and trade policies has been non-trivial. The anti-agricultural bias peaked for the region 
in the 1980s and more than US$10 billion per year in current dollar terms (and hence much 
more than that in 2008 dollars), assuming non-studied Latin American countries had the same 
NRAs as the studied countries other than Mexico (see bottom row of Table 1.14). That is 
equivalent to a gross tax of around $250 for each person engaged in agriculture. Nearly two-
thirds of that $10 billion was due to Brazil’s policies. Thanks to the reforms of the past two 
decades, such taxation has gradually disappeared in all all studied countries except Argentina 
and Nicaragua. But the reform does not mean there is no intervention now. Rather, the old 
policy has been replaced by positive assistance to farmers in those six countries, averaging 
almost $6 billion per year or around $150 per farm worker over the past decade. That $150 is 
small compared with per capita income for the region (about 4 percent), but it ranges from 
more than $500 for Colombia (one-quarter of its per capita GDP in 2000-04) to -$1700 for 
Argentina (minus one-third of its per capita GDP). The extent of that dramatic transformation 
for the region as a whole over the past two decades is illustrated in Figure 1.5 for the 
individual countries and in Figure 1.6 for key products. The latter reveals that, as for most 
other regions of the world, the lion’s share of assistance goes to the rice pudding ingredients 
(milk, sugar and rice itself). 
 
Assistance to non-farm sectors and relative rates of assistance 
 
The anti-agricultural policy biases of the past were due not just to agricultural policies. Also 
important to changes in incentives afffecting inter-sectorally mobile resources have been the 
significant reduction in border protection to the manufacturing sector and its indirect impact 
on reducing the price of nontradables since the initiation of the reforms, together with the 
deregulation and privatization of services. The reduction in assistance to non-farm tradable 
sectors has been as much responsible for the expansion of agricultural exports since the early 
1990s as the reduction in direct taxation of those agricultural exports. 
  Quantifying that distortion to non-farm tradable sectors has not been able to be done 
as carefully as that for agriculture. Authors have had to rely on applied trade taxes (for 
exports as well as imports) rather than be able to undertake price comparisons, and hence 





decades but decreasingly so through recent times.
6 Nor do they capture distortions in the 
services sectors, many of which now produce tradables (or would do in the absence of 
interventions preventing their emergence). As a result the estimated NRAs for non-farm 
importables are smaller and decline less rapidly than in fact was the case – and likewise for 
non-farm exportables, except their NRAs in most cases would have been negative. Of those 
two elements of under-estimation, the former bias probably dominated, so the authors’ 
estimate of the overall NRA for non-agricultural tradables should be considered a lower-
bound estimate, and more so in the past so that its decline is less rapid than it should be.
7  
Despite these methodological limitations, the estimated NRAs for non-farm tradables 
are very sizeable prior to the 1990s. For Latin America as a whole, their average value has 
steadily declined throughout the past four decades as policy reforms have spread. This has 
therefore contributed to a decline in the estimated relative rate of assistance for farmers: the 
RRA has fallen from more than -30 percent in the 1970s to an average of less than -1 percent 
in 2000-04 (Table 1.11), and it appears in Figure 1.7 to be as much due to falling positive 
NRAs for non-farm producers as it is to falling negative NRAs for farmers. The striking 
extent of the change in RRAs for individual countries over the past two decades is evident in 
Figure 1.8, particularly for Brazil and Dominican Republic (virtual disappearance of negative 
RRAs) and for Colombia (a switch from negative to positive RRA). The four-decade trend in 
RRAs for each country is summarized in Table 1.16.  
 
Comparisons with other regions 
 
The regional upward shift in agricultural NRAs and the RRAs towards zero and even the 
move to a positive NRA in the past decade are not unique to Latin America. Figure 1.9 shows 
that even steeper trends have resulted from policy reforms in other developing country 
regions over the past four decades, suggesting that similar political economy trends might be 
at work as economies develop. This is despite the fact that farm-nonfarm houeshold income 
inequality is very different in Latin America than in the rest of the world (Figure 1.10). In the 
                                                 
6 Also ignored are distortions to the prices of inputs into non-farm goods production, again in contrast to their 
treatment in estimating agricultural NRAs. 
7 This bias is accentuated in those cases where distortions to exchange rates are not included, as noted above in 
the methodology section. Exchange rate distortions were included only in the studies for Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua, and those economies are too small for their inclusion to affect noticeably the weighted 
average NRAs and RRAs for the region as a whole. Their impact was greatest in Ecuador, where it made the 
RRA more negative to the extent of about 2 percenatage points in the 1970s, 6 percentage points in the 1980s 





past it has been found that agricultural NRAs and RRAs are positively correlated with per 
capita income and agricultural comparative disadvantage (Anderson 1995). A glance at Table 
1.17 suggests that Latin American countries have been – and continue to be – contributors to 
that trend. This is confirmed statistically in the simple regressions with country fixed effects 
shown in Figure 1.11 (apart from RRA and agricultural comparative advantage), and with the 
multiple regressions with country and time fixed effects shown in Table 1.18. 
 
Consumer tax equivalents of agricultural policies 
 
The extent to which farm policies impact on the retail consumer price of food and on the 
price of livestock feedstuffs depends on a wide range of things including the degree of 
processing undertaken and the extent of competition along the value chain. We therefore 
attempt only to ask how much impact policies have on the buyer’s price at the level where the 
farm product is first traded internationally and hence where price comparisons are made (e.g., 
as wheat, or raw sugar, or beef). And to obtain weights to make it possible to sum up across 
commodities and countries we calculate the volume of apparent consumption simply as 
production plus net imports and then value it at undistorted prices.  
If there were no farm input distortions and no domestic output price distortions such 
that the NRA was entirely the result of border measures such as an import or export tax, then 
the CTE would equal the NRA for each covered product. Since those former distortions are 
relatively minor in Latin America, and the NRA tends to be positive for import-competing 
products and negative until recently for exportables, then so too is the CTE. This is evident in 
the CTE estimates summarized in Tables 1.19. The weighted average CTE for the region is 
thus negative for most of the period, averaging around -15 percent until the 1990s and 
marginally above zero thereafter. The variance across products is somewhat less now than 
before the reforms of the past two decades, but still considerable. 
In proportional terms the current transfers from consumers are largest in Colombia 
and Ecuador, but in dollar terms they are also large in Mexico. At its peak in the 1980s, the 
transfer from producers to consumers in the region amounted to $7 billion per year at the 
producer level for products covered in this project, whereas in the present decade the transfer 
on average is from consumers to producers and amounts to around $3 billion per year (Table 





But even taking into account assistance to non-covered products,
8 the total transfer from 
consumers would amount to less than $15 per capita in recent years.  
  
Summary: What have we learned? 
 
The most salient feature of price and trade policies in the Latin American region since the 
1960s is the major economic reforms during the latter 1980s/early 1990s in most countries, 
including significant trade liberalization. Overall levels of non-agricultural protection have 
declined considerably, most significantly for the industrial sector, and there have been 
reforms in the service sector (deregulation and privatization). Both changes have worked to 
improve the competitiveness of the agricultural sector.  
More specifically, the following features of the Latin American experience of the past 
40+ years are worth highlighting by way of summarizing the key findings of this regional 
study. 
Since the 1970s the region has seen a gradual movement away from taxing farmers 
relative to non-agricultural producers and the emergence of positive assistance for 
agriculture from the early 1990s. The gradual fall in the estimated (negative) relative rate of 
assistance for the region, from as much as -40 percent in the early 1970s to less than -2 
percent in the past decade, has been not dissimilar to the trends in Africa and Asia but is 
nonetheless dramatic. Instead of being efffectively taxed more than $10 billion per year as in 
the 1980s (or $250 per person working in agriculture), farmers in the region now enjoy 
support worth more than $5 billion per year or nearly $150 per person employed on farms. 
An exception is Argentina, where there was a policy reform reversal back to direct export 
taxation in late 2001 – but that has to be seen in the context of the massive devaluation at that 
time as the country abandoned its fixed parity with the US dollar. Thanks to that devaluation, 
Argentina continued to contribute to the rapid growth of Latin America’s share of global 
exports of farm products that was stimulated by the gradual elimination of anti-agricultural 
policies. 
 The dispersion across Latin American countries in nominal and relative rates of 
assistance to farmers has not diminished much despite the reforms in all countries. This 
result means there is still lots of scope for reducing distortions in the region’s use of resources 
                                                 
8 Since the coverage ratio is around two-thirds of production (see final row of Table 1.10), and the 
‘guesstimated’ distortion for non-covered products is less than for covered products (row 2 of Table 1.11), the 
value of consumer transfers for non-covered products would add considerably less than half (so less than $2 





in agriculture. That finding also suggests there are political economy forces at work in each 
country that do not change greatly relative to other countries over time. In particular, the 
econometric results reported above suggest the NRAag and RRA tend to rise with per capita 
income and to be higher the lower a country’s agricultural comparative advantage.  
The dispersion in nominal rates of assistance to farmers within each studied Latin 
American country also has not diminished much. This result means there is still scope for 
reducing distortions in resource use within agriculture even in countries with an average 
NRAag and RRA close to zero. As in other regions, the products in Latin America with the 
highest rates of distortion and gross subsidy equivalent values are rice, sugar and milk. 
In particular, the strong anti-trade bias in assistance rates within the farm sector 
remains in place. In the 1970s the NRA for import-competing farm industries averaged close 
to zero in the region. But since then it has increased to an average of around 20 percent, while 
the NRA for agricultural exportables has only become less negative. The fact that the average 
NRAs for import-competing and exportable agricultural industries have risen almost in 
parallel means that the trade bias index has not fallen much. This may be understandable 
from a political economy viewpoint, but it nonetheless means that resources are not allocated 
efficiently within the farm sector and – since openness tends to promote economic growth – 
that total factor productivity growth in agriculture is slower than it would be if remaining 
interventions were removed. 
The most important instruments of farm assistance/taxation continue to be trade-
restrictive measures. Domestic taxes and subsidies on farm inputs and outputs, and non-
product-specific assistance, have made only minor contributions to the estimates of NRAs for 
Latin America. 
Because agricultural taxation or assistance is mostly due to trade measures, 
movements in the consumer tax equivalent closely replicate changes in farm support/taxation 
-- which means that before the reforms food prices were kept artificially low but in recent 
years they have been above international levels on average. It also means there is 
considerable variation in consumer tax equivalents across products and across countries in the 
region. They are highest for milk, rice and sugar but are negative on average for maize, beef 
and soybean. The current level of taxation of food consumers for the region as a whole is 
small though, amounting to less than $15 per capita per year.  
The decline in negative relative rates of assistance has been due as much to cuts in 
protection for non-agricultural sectors as to reforms of agricultural policies. This 





have been part of a series of economywide reform programs and not just due to farm policy 
reforms.   
 
 
Poverty and policy implications 
 
 
The assistance trends provided in this chapter are in one sense encouraging for economic 
policy advisors: the long period of import-substituting industrialization and of taxes on 
primary exports, that so heavily discriminated against the agricultural sector in Latin 
America, has largely been relegated to history. However, as the above summary of our 
findings makes clear, that does not mean there are no longer policies that are distorting 
agricultural incentives. And if Latin America were to follow the policy path chosen by more-
advanced economies, involving increasing agricultural assistance as per capita income rises, 
there may be even more in the future. This suggests vigilance will still be needed by 
economic policy advisors in the years to come. Meanwhile, the opposite policy problem 
remains in Argentina, where explicit export taxation was re-introduced in late 2001 and has 
been increased a number of times since then.  
Neither taxes on agricultural imports to reduce import competition for poor farmers, 
nor taxes on agricultural exports to lower the cost of food for the urban poor, is the most 
efficient way to reduce poverty (Winters, McCulloch and McKay 2004). Poverty alleviating 
objectives are laudible, but trade policy instruments are almost never the first-best way to 
achieve them. On the contrary, food trade taxes may even worsen poverty, depending on the 
earning and spending patterns of poor households and on the alternative tax-raising 
instruments available. Far more preferable would be microeconomic reforms to mitigate 
deep-seated structural problems affecting the competitiveness of factor and goods markets. 
This is because the reforms have accentuated differences between commercially oriented 
farmers and those less prepared to take advantage of the economic liberalization. Nor have 
there been policies in place to mitigate the human costs of economic adjustment and the 
aggravation of rural poverty (Spoor 2000; Valdés and Foster 2003). The challenge for the 
years ahead is to develop more-efficient ways to address these policy concerns so that the 
process of reducing remaining distortions to agricultural versus non-agricultural incentives 
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Table 1.1: Key economic and trade indicators, Latin America countries, 2000-04  
  Share (%) of world:  National rel. to world 
(world=100) 


































6.49 4.49 7.73  69  178  219  0.42  7  52 
Argentina  0.61 0.54 1.04  89  426  541  0.85  5  51 
Brazil  2.88 1.54 3.38  54  184  355  0.66  8  57 
Chile  0.25 0.22 0.24  86  120  386  0.63  2  55 
Colombia  0.70 0.24 0.77  35  132  264  0.25  7  59 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.14 0.06 0.18  41  54  474  0.29  3  52 
Ecuador  0.20 0.07 0.16  33  80  487  0.59  16  44 
Mexico  1.62 1.82 1.89  112  133  64 -0.17  7  46 
Nicaragua  0.08 0.01 0.06  14  169  952  0.26  44  43 
Other LA 
countries 
1.84 0.84 2.05  46  148  na  na  na  na 
Caribbean  0.20 0.07 0.13  36  23  na  na  na  na 
Central 
America 
0.52 0.21 0.78  41  55  504  0.26  na  na 
South 
America 
1.12 0.56 1.13  50  213  157  0.16  13  na 
All  LA  8.33 5.33 9.78  64  171  na  na  na  na 
a Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in 
national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of global exports.  
 
b Primary agricultural trade specialization index is net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports 
and imports of agricultural and processed food products (world average =0.0). 
 
c Percentage of the population living on less than US $1 per day. 
 
d The poverty incidence and Gini index are for the most recent year available between 2000 
and 2004, except for Ecuador where they refer to 1998. The weighted averages for the 
studied countries use population as the basis for weights. 
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled mainly from World  





Table 1.2: Growth of real GDP, Latin America countries, 1980 to 2004 
 
(at constant 2000 prices, percent per year, trend-based) 
 





Countries 3.1  4.0 7.0 5.7 
 
3.9 
Argentina 3.8  2.8 6.1 4.8  3.5 
Brazil 3.5  3.1 6.2 5.0  3.2 
Chile 4.1  6.9 7.6 7.2  5.5 
Colombia 2.7  4.0 6.8 5.4  3.4 
Dominican Rep.  3.3  6.7 5.7 5.6  3.8 
Ecuador 2.4  2.0 5.8 4.1  2.0 
Mexico 2.4  5.3 7.7 6.7  4.8 
Nicaragua 1.1  1.7 4.0 2.7  0.4 
Other LA 
Countries na  na na 4.2 
 
2.1 
Caribbean na  na na 3.5  2.1 
Central America  3.5  6.8 6.9 6.3  3.9 
South America  4.4  5.0 7.1 3.7  1.6 
All LA  na  na na 5.4  3.6 
 












 Agriculture Industry  Services 
  65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 
LA Studied 
Countries  13 11  9  6 35 36 37 28 53 53 54 66
Argentina  10 8 8 7 48 48 39 28 42 45  53  65
Brazil  13 11  9  8 30 35 40 32 57 54 51 61
Chile  8 8 8 4 40 37 38 37 53 55  53  59
Colombia  28 23 17 11 27 30 36 26 45 47 47 63
Domin  Rep 21 19 14 11 25 30 24 31 53 50 61 57
Ecuador  26 16 15  8 23 37 37 30 51 47 48 61
Mexico  12 10  8  4 27 31 31 24 62 59 61 72
Nicaragua  24 24 26 17 24 28 28 26 52 48 46 56
Other LA 
Countries  na na na  9 na na na 33 na na na 58
Caribbean  na na na  7 na na na 32 na na na 61
Central 
America  na na 20 13 na na 22 23 na na 59 64
South 
America  na 9 9 7 na 41 42 37 na 50  50  56
A l l   L A   n a  n a  n a   6n an an a2 9n an a  n a  6 5
 








Table 1.4: Agriculture’s shares of employment, Latin America countries, 1965 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
  1965-69 1975-79 1985-89 2000-04 
LA Studied 
Countries 44 36 27 17 
Argentina 17 14 12 9 
Brazil 50 40 27 16 
Chile 26 22 19 15 
Colombia 47 42 31 20 
Dominican 
Republic  52 37 27 16 
Ecuador 54 43 35 25 
Mexico 47 39 30 21 
Nicaragua 55 43 32 19 
Other LA 
Countries 49 42 35 28 
Caribbean 61 55 51 44 
Central America  59 50 42 32 
South America  41 34 29 23 
All LA  45 37 29 19 
 






Table 1.5: Sectoral shares of merchandise exports, Latin America countries, 1965 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
 Agriculture  and 
processed food 
Other primary  Other goods 
  65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 
LA Studied 
Countries  na 55 32 20 na 20 29 17 na 24 38 63
A r g e n t i n a   9 0  7 4  6 5  4 8115 2 09 2 5  2 9  3 0
Brazil  83 57 35 32 8 12 14 13 9 30 50 54
Chile  8 21 34 34 89 69 56 48 4 10  9 16
Colombia  77 75 54 24 15 5 25 40 8 19 20 37
Domin  Rep   na 76 48 42 na 3 0 18 na 20 51 34
Ecuador  97 44 48 43 1 54 50 46 2 2  2 10
Mexico  58 35 14  6 22 39 46 11 20 26 40 83
N i c a r a g u a   8 7  8 3  8 9  8 541128 1 6   9  1 2
Other LA 
Countries  na 21 25 na na na na na na 10 17 na
Caribbean  na 12 14 na na na na na na 21 40 na
Central 
America 
7 8  7 5  7 7  4 55435 1 7 2 0  1 9  5 0
South 
America 
na 10 14 14 na 85 74 71 na 5 12 15
All LA  na 42 31 na na na na na na 18 33 na
 








Table 1.6: Indexes of comparative advantage in agriculture and processed food,
a Latin 
America countries, 1965 to 2004 
 
(a) Revealed comparative advantage index,
a world = 1.0 
 
  1965-69 1975-79 1985-89 1995-99 2000-04 
      
LA Studied Countries  na 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Argentina  3.5 3.8 4.4 4.9 5.4 
Brazil  3.3 2.9 2.4 3.2 3.6 
Chile  0.3 1.1 2.3 3.4 3.9 
Colombia  3.0 3.9 3.6 3.2 2.6 
Dominican Republic  na 3.9 3.2 1.2 4.7 
Ecuador  3.8 2.3 3.2 5.5 4.9 
Mexico  2.3 1.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 
Nicaragua  3.4 4.3 6.1 7.4  9.5 
Other LA Countries  na 1.1 1.7 2.5 na 
Caribbean  na 0.6 0.9 1.5  na 
Central America  3.1 3.8 5.2 5.4 5.0 
South America  na 0.5 1.0 1.6 1.6 
All Latin America  na 2.1 2.1 2.2  2.2 
 
 
(b) Trade specialization index,
b world = 0.0 
 
  1965-69 1975-79 1985-89 2000-04 
      
LA Studied Countries  na  0.6  0.5  0.4 
Argentina  0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 
Brazil  0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Chile  -0.5 0.0 0.7 0.6 
Colombia  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 
Dominican  Republic  na 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Ecuador  0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Mexico 0.6  0.2  -0.1  -0.2 
Nicaragua  0.7 0.8 0.4 0.3 
Other LA Countries  na  0.2  na  na 
Caribbean na  -0.2  na  na 
Central  America  0.6 0.7 0.6 0.3 
South America  na  -0.2  0.0  0.2 
All Latin America  na 0.5 na na 
 
 
a Share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of 
global merchandise exports. 
 
b Net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food 
products.          
 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s World 










  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
LA studied countries  12  13 14 13 16  22
Argentina  12 12 10 8 10 18
Brazil  7 10 10 9 8 15
Chile  22 20 32 30 28 35
Colombia  16 12 16 17 13 18
Dominican  Republic  21 20 43 48 46 45
Ecuador  24 23 28 27 25 28
Mexico  11 15 20 16 31 29
Nicaragua  35 19 12 21 20 21
Other LA Countries  27  25 24 25 24  26
Caribbean  52 44 37 42 42 42
Central  America  32 24 23 25 28 28
South  America  24 23 22 23 20 24





Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled from World Bank’s World 





Table 1.8: Export orientation, import dependence and self-sufficiency in primary 
agricultural production, Latin America countries, 1965 to 2004 
(percent at undistorted prices) 
 (a) Exports as share of production 
 
  1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
          
LA studied countries
c  28 27 24 17 17 16 22 27
    
Argentina  33 22 28 27 28 27 28 28
Brazil
a  35 40 23 11 12 11 18 26
Chile 1  1 5 23 16 13  13 18
Colombia  21 21 26 25 27 17 18 16
Dominican  Rep.  33 35 42 56 22 16 13 9
Ecuador
a  35 33 30 49 35 35 39 34
Mexico
b na  na na 11 15 16  27 31
Nicaragua na  na na na na 10  15 14
 
(b) Imports as share of apparent consumption 
 
  1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
    
LA studied countries
c  4  4576 1 0   1 2 1 6
    
A r g e n t i n a   1  10001  21
Brazil
a  8  76534  65
Chile 7  14 15 13 3 5  7 6
C o l o m b i a   2  22333  6 1 0
D o m i n i c a n   R e p .   1  11012  21
Ecuador
a  0  01222  42
Mexico
b na  na na 15 15 25  31 39
Nicaragua na  na na na na 4  2 2
 
 
(c) Self-sufficiency ratio 
 
  1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
         
LA studied countries
c  133 132 126 110 113 107 112 114
    
Argentina  152 127 140 142 145 136 136 138
Brazil
a  142 161 122 109 110 107 114 130
Chile 93  87 89 95 115 109  107 115
Colombia  124 124 134 130 136 117 114 108
Dominican  Rep.  149 152 173 143 126 117 113 108
Ecuador
a  152 150 143 132 153 151 157 148
Mexico
b na  na 106 94 99 90  95 89
Nicaragua na  na na na na 107  115 115
a 1965-69 is 1966-69 
b 1980-84 is 1979-84 
c  Excluding Mexico pre-1979 and Nicaragua pre-1990 
Source: Compiled using the project’s estimates of total agricultural production valued 





Table 1.9: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a Latin America countries, 1965 to 2004 
(percent)  
 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Argentina  -22.7 -22.9 -20.4 -19.3 -15.8 -7.0  -4.0 -14.9
Brazil
c  -6.1  -27.3 -23.3 -25.7 -21.1 -11.3 8.0 4.1
Chile  16.2  12.0 4.5 7.2 13.0 7.9 8.2 5.8
Colombia  -4.7  -14.8 -13.0 5.0 0.2 8.2 13.2 25.9
Dominican Rep.  5.0  -17.5 -21.2 -30.7 -36.4 -1.0 9.2 2.5
Ecuador
c  -9.6 -22.4 -15.0 5.9 -1.0 -5.3  -2.0  10.1
Mexico  na na na 2.9 3.0 30.8  4.2  11.6
Nicaragua
c  na na na na na -3.2  -11.3  -4.2
LA countries studied: 
  Unweighted average
b  -2.8  -15.5 -14.5 -7.7 -8.3 2.3 3.2 4.9
  Weighted. average
a  -7.2  -21.0 -18.0 -12.5 -10.9 4.2 5.5 4.8
Dispersion of individual 
country NRAs
d  13.8 15.4 10.8 17.4 17.1 13.5  8.6 11.9
 
a Weighted average for each country, including product-specific input distortions and non-
product specific assistance as well as authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm products, 
with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
 
b The unweighted average is the simple average across the eight countries of their national 
NRA (weighted) averages.  
 
c Ecuador and Brazil 1965-69 column refers to 1966-69 data; and Nicaragua 1990-94 column 
to 1991-94 data. 
 
d Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted 
mean of the national agricultural sector NRAs each year. 
 





Table 1.10: Dispersion of nominal rates of assistance across covered agricultural products,
a 




   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Argentina  18.5 17.8 19.9 15.7 12.1  7.1  9.4 12.6 
Brazil  28.1 37.2 41.0 35.9 25.5 27.4  8.5  7.6 
Chile  33.0 37.2 30.4 17.0 26.1 16.5 14.7 13.3 
Colombia  34.8 21.2 29.9 42.5 34.1 27.2 31.0 46.0 
Dominican  Rep.  86.5 64.0 89.3 83.0  102.3  137.1 92.6  132.8 
Ecuador  99.0 88.6  104.8  106.2 48.5 18.8 27.9 29.6 
Mexico  na  na  na 71.9 60.1 57.7 30.6 41.1 
Nicaragua  na na na na na  40.1  35.7  27.7 
LA countries studies: 
  Unweighted average
c  50.0 44.3 52.5 53.2 44.1 41.5 31.3 38.8 
 
        
Product coverage
d   54 65 68 71 68 66 65 69 
70 
a Dispersion for each country is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation 
around a weighted mean of NRAs across covered products each year. 
 
c Ecuador and Brazil 1965-69 column refers to 1966-69 data; and Nicaragua 1990-94 column 
to 1991-94 data. 
 
c The unweighted average is the simple average across the eight countries of their 5-year 
simple average dispersion measures. 
 
d Share of gross value of total agricultural production at undistorted prices accounted for by 
covered products. 
 





Table 1.11: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, 
Latin American region, 1965 to 2004  
 
(a) Unweighted averages for 8 studied countries (percent) 
    1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products
a  -9.1  -21.8  -17.0  -8.8  -8.9 1.0 1.1 4.4 
Non-covered products  -0.5 -9.2  -10.0 -6.5 -7.5  1.4  0.9  0.4 
All agricultural 
products
a  -5.4  -17.0  -15.0  -8.3  -9.3 0.4 0.7 2.7 
Total agricultural 
NRA (incl. NPS)
b  -2.8  -15.5  -14.5  -7.7  -8.3 2.3 3.2 4.9 
Trade Bias Index
c  -0.22 -0.18 -0.31 -0.41 -0.33 -0.26 -0.25 -0.26 
          
Assistance to just 
tradables:          
   All agricultural 
tradables
b  -6.0  -19.0  -16.4  -7.2  -8.2 2.6 3.5 5.7 
   All non-agricultural 
tradables  16.8 20.6 15.6 14.3 13.4 7.7 7.3 6.5 
Relative rate of 
assistance, RRA
d  -19.5 -32.9 -27.7 -18.8 -19.1  -4.8  -3.5  -0.8 
 
(b) Weighted averages for 8 studied countries (percent) 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products
a  -13.0 -25.1 -19.6 -14.6  -14.3 0.9 0.8 2.7 
Non-covered products  -3.3 -15.5 -15.0 -10.9 -13.1  0.7  3.8  2.1 
All agricultural 
products
a  -8.6 -21.7 -18.1 -13.6 -14.0  0.8  1.7  2.5 
Total agricultural 
NRA (incl. NPS)
b  -7.2 -21.0 -18.0 -12.5 -10.9  4.2  5.5  4.8 
Trade Bias Index
c  -0.20 -0.25 -0.26 -0.36 -0.29 -0.25 -0.14 -0.21 
          
Assistance to just 
tradables:          
   All agricultural 
tradables
b  -9.3 -23.0 -19.0 -12.9 -11.2  4.4  5.5  4.9 
   All non-agricultural 
tradables  15.9 27.8 23.3 18.5 16.8 7.3 6.6 5.5 
Relative rate of 
assistance, RRA
d  -21.4 -39.8 -34.2 -26.6 -24.0  -2.7  -1.0  -0.6 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies.  
b NRAs including non-product-specific (NPS) assistance, that is, the assistance to all primary 
factors and intermediate inputs as a percentage of the total primary agricultural production 
valued at undistorted prices. 
c Trade Bias Index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and 
NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of 
the agricultural sector. The regional average TBI is calculated from the regional averages of 
the NRAs for exportable and import-competing parts of the agricultural sector.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively.  





Table 1.12: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural exportables, import-competing 
products, and the trade bias index,
a Latin America countries, 1965 to 2004  
 (percent) 
 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Argentina             
NRA agric. exp  -22.7 -22.9 -20.4 -19.3 -15.8  -7.0  -4.0 -14.9 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na na na na na na na na 
Trade Bias Index  -0.23 -0.23 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.07 -0.04 -0.15 
Brazil
 b           
NRA agric. exp  -8.4 -33.2 -30.0 -31.5 -29.5 -18.9  0.4  1.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  41.4 26.6 -1.9 -6.8  -22.5  -15.6  7.8 11.6 
Trade Bias Index  -0.35 -0.47 -0.27 -0.21 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 
Chile           
NRA agric. exp  21.9 35.2 -1.2 -2.0 -1.2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 
NRA agric. imp-comp  -5.4  -11.3  3.4 10.1 21.3 13.8 12.5  6.3 
Trade Bias Index  0.31  0.53 -0.04 -0.11 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 
Colombia           
NRA agric. exp  -9.8  -17.7  -17.5 -9.2 -8.8  1.7 -1.7 26.0 
NRA agric. imp-comp  8.2  -14.8 -2.8 52.7 26.6 16.7 40.0 46.2 
Trade Bias Index  -0.15  0.00 -0.11 -0.40 -0.27 -0.11 -0.29 -0.13 
Dominican Rep.           
NRA agric. exp  -10.9 -27.5 -36.1 -51.7 -61.0 -44.6 -13.4 -29.4 
NRA agric. imp-comp  40.8 14.7 15.9 20.2  6.7 69.8 48.5 43.7 
Trade Bias Index  -0.37 -0.36 -0.44 -0.59 -0.61 -0.67 -0.42 -0.51 
Ecuador 
b           
NRA agric. exp  -20.6 -40.0 -43.2 -31.1 -26.1 -11.0  -9.3  -3.2 
NRA agric. imp-comp  -1.9  -14.5 26.4 53.8 26.7 -1.0  7.8 22.2 
Trade Bias Index  -0.19 -0.28 -0.55 -0.55 -0.38 -0.09 -0.15 -0.20 
Mexico           
NRA agric. exp  na  na  na -35.1 -27.9  4.7 -16.0 -19.9 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na  na  na 21.4 19.2 43.1  8.3 21.4 
Trade Bias Index  na  na  na -0.47 -0.39 -0.27 -0.23 -0.34 
Nicaragua 
b          
NRA agric. exp  na na na na na  -14.9  -29.1  -18.1 
NRA agric. imp-comp  na na na na na  12.5  17.5  24.9 
Trade Bias Index  na na na na na  -0.24  -0.39  -0.33 




c           
NRA agric. exp  -7.8 -17.7 -25.0 -25.7 -24.3 -11.4  -9.2  -7.5 
NRA agric. imp-comp  17.5 0.1 8.3  25.2  13.0 19.7 20.3 25.1 
Trade Bias Index
   -0.22 -0.18 -0.31 -0.41 -0.33 -0.26 -0.25 -0.26 
All LA studied 
countries (wted. av.)
c            
NRA agric. exp  -12.8  -27.0  -25.2  -27.1  -25.0  -10.5 -3.5 -4.6 
NRA agric. imp-comp  8.7  -2.8  1.1  13.6  5.1 19.4 12.5 20.6 
Trade Bias Index   -0.20 -0.25 -0.26 -0.36 -0.29 -0.25 -0.14 -0.21 
a Trade Bias Index, TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagx and NRAagm are 
the average percentage NRAs for the exportable and import-competing parts of the agricultural sector. 
b Ecuador and Brazil 1965-69 column refers to 1966-69 data; and Nicaragua 1990-94 column to 1991-
94 data. For Brazil, NRA import-competing in 1970-74 includes rice only for 1973 and 1974. 
c Regional averages of the trade bias index are calculated from the regional averages of the NRAs for 
exportable and import-competing parts of the agricultural sector.   





Table 1.13: Nominal rates of assistance for covered farm products, by policy instrument, 




   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94  1995-99 2000-04 
Argentina    
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0 0.1  0.2 0.5 0.1  -1.0  -4.2 -2.8
NRA, domestic market support  -0.6 -0.8  -0.4 -0.7 -1.5  -1.2  -0.4 -1.4
NRA, border market support  -25.7 -27.1  -24.6 -22.0 -17.2  -6.2  -0.5 -11.6
NRA, agric. total  -26.3 -27.9  -24.7 -22.2 -18.6  -8.3  -5.2 -15.8
Brazil
      
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0 0.0  0.0 4.4 2.5  4.7  4.2 2.4
NRA, domestic market support  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
NRA, border market support  -6.1 -27.3  -23.3 -32.4 -30.1  -22.7  -2.4 -0.4
NRA, agric. total  -6.1 -27.3  -23.3 -28.0 -27.6  -18.0  1.8 2.0
Chile     
NRA, agric. inputs  -3.7 -3.3  -2.8 -4.4 -5.8 -4.0  -2.1 -1.3
NRA, domestic market support  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
NRA, border market support  -2.6 -7.3  5.4 8.5 26.4  17.7  13.4 8.0
NRA, agric. total  -6.3 -10.6  2.5 4.2 20.6  13.7  11.2 6.7
Colombia     
NRA, agric. inputs  -2.1 -1.7  -1.1 -1.6 -2.6 -1.8  -1.5 -1.5
NRA, domestic market support  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
NRA, border market support  -4.2 -14.6  -13.5 5.5 1.7  7.9  11.4 30.2
NRA, agric. total  -6.3 -16.4  -14.6 3.9 -0.9  6.1  10.0 28.6
Dominican Rep.     
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
NRA, domestic market support  0.0 0.5  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
NRA, border market support  5.0 -18.0  -21.2 -30.7 -36.4  -1.0  9.2 2.5
NRA, agric. total  5.0 -17.5  -21.2 -30.7 -36.4  -1.0  9.2 2.5
Ecuador     
NRA, agric. inputs  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0
NRA, domestic market support  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 1.4  0.0  0.0 0.0
NRA, border market support  -14.7 -31.5  -20.8 9.9 -2.2  -6.4  -2.0 12.2
NRA, agric. total  -14.8 -31.5  -20.8 9.9 -0.8  -6.4  -2.0 12.2
Mexico     
NRA, agric. inputs  na na 3.9 7.7 5.3  5.2  1.6 2.3
NRA, domestic market support  na na 4.1 5.2 2.9  4.4  1.3 2.8
NRA, border market support  na na -11.1 -11.4 -7.1  19.2  -2.8 4.0
NRA, agric. total  na na -3.1 1.5 1.1  28.8  0.1 9.2
Nicaragua     
NRA, agric. inputs  na na na na na  0.0  0.0 0.0
NRA, domestic market support  na na na na na  -3.2  -2.4 -2.8
NRA, border market support  na na na na na  0.0  0.0 0.0






Table 1.13 (cont.): Nominal rates of assistance for covered farm products, by policy 
 instrument, Latin American region, 1965 to 2004  
 
(percent) 
  1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94  1995-99 2000-04 
All LA studied countries 
 (unweighted average)     
NRA, agric. inputs  -1.0 -0.8  -0.5 1.0 -0.1  0.1  -0.5 -0.5
NRA, domestic market support  -0.1 -0.1  0.1 0.6 0.4  0.4  0.1 0.2
NRA, border market support  -7.5 -21.0  -16.4 -10.4 -9.2  0.4  1.5 4.4
NRA, agric. total  -8.6 -21.8  -16.8 -8.8 -8.9  0.9  1.1 4.1
All LA studied countries 
 (weighted average)
a    
NRA, agric. inputs  -0.9 -0.6  0.0 3.8 1.7  2.8  1.2 0.9
NRA, domestic market support  -0.2 -0.2  0.2 1.3 0.7  1.1  0.3 0.6
NRA, border market support  -11.9 -24.4  -19.8 -19.8 -16.8  -3.0  -0.6 1.2
NRA, agric. total  -13.0 -25.1  -19.6 -14.6 -14.3  0.9  0.8 2.7
 
a Weights are based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
 






Table 1.14: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total and per farm worker, 
Latin American countries,
a 1965 to 2004 
 
(a) Total (current US$ million) 
 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79  1980-84 1985-89  1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Argentina -406  -815 -996 -1777 -1132 -612  -569  -2609
Brazil  -189  -2531 -3393 -7700 -6778 -2991 2968 1576
Chile  114 108 77 163 286 332 443 303
Colombia  -87 -483 -712 378 -7 802 1488 1906
Dominican Rep.  14  -141 -238 -431 -412 -15  142  37
Ecuador -47  -146 -187 80 -22 -111  -67  337
Mexico na  na na 834 539 6418  995  2861
Nicaragua na  na na na na -28  -133  -57
LA countries 
studied  -601  -4009 -5450 -8454 -7525 3797 5267 4354
All LA countries
a  -742  -4949 -6728 -10437 -9290 4688 6503 5376
 
(b) Per person engaged in agriculture (current US$) 
 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Argentina -261  -550 -698 -1265 -778 -414  -387  -1786
Brazil  -12  -154 -198 -445 -416 -201 214 123
Chile  154 147 99 198 321 350 456 308
Colombia  -29  -150 -200 99 -2 216 399 515
Dominican Rep.  20  -197 -339 -623 -589 -22  225  63
Ecuador -49  -145 -184 76 -19 -91  -54  270
Mexico  n.a. n.a. n.a. 102 64 749 116 336
Nicaragua  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -71 -334 -144
LA countries 
studied  -21  -130 -167 -251 -227 119 170 147
All LA countries
a  -20  -123 -159 -238 -211 108 150 126
 
 
a Assumes the rate of assistance in non-studied countries is the same as the average for the 
studied Latin American countries excluding Mexico, and that their share of the value of Latin 
American and Caribbean (excluding Mexican) agricultural production at undistorted prices is 
the same as their average share of the region’s agricultural GDP at distorted prices during 
1990-2004, which was 23 percent. 
 





Table 1.15: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers in Latin America, by product 
and sub-sector, 1965 to 2004 
 
(a) by product (at undistorted farmgate prices, $US millions) 
 
 Rice  Wheat    Maize 
Other 
Grains  Soybean 
Other 
oilseeds  Sugar Cotton   
1965-69  24  -17  -92 0 1 0 8  -19   
1970-74  -40 -216 -162  -1  -55  0  -1829  -8   
1975-79 -230  91 -475  -56 -436  -81  -1619 -159   
1980-84  -55  116 -396  53 -428 -110  -3260 -156   
1985-89  -55  65 -707  10  -1533 -151  -1980 -380   
1990-94  201  395  -17  -5 -386  -92 -988 -158   
1995-99  569  79 -373 -151 -279 -256  233  36   
2000-04  614  30 -307 -113  -1371 -241  970  78   
          
 Cocoa Coffee 
Fruit 
& veg  Beef  Pigmeat  Poultry  Egg  Milk 
All 
covered 
1965-69 1  -127  -19  -289 1  10  na 2  -516 
1970-74  -8 -169  -41 -440  -4  15  na  -29  -2987 
1975-79  -32 -815 -163 -404  -53  116  -51  236  -4131 
1980-84  -8 -3014  -165 -1027  -565  423  -14  1603 -7003 
1985-89  -17  -1738 -623 -327 -504  344  -66  944  -6716 
1990-94  -14 30  -610  188 93  533 19  1471  661 
1995-99  -10 -536 -977  704 -110  378 -225 1393  476 
2000-04  -7  76 -750 -264  111 1048 -285 1915 1504 
 
(b) by sub-sector (at undistorted farmgate prices, US$ billions) 
 
Total GSE, all direct assistance to farmers
a 
  





GSE for just 
non-covered 
farm 




tradables   
1965-69  -0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.7 0.1 0.0   
1970-74  -3.0 -1.1 -4.0 -3.9 -0.2 0.0   
1975-79  -4.0 -1.5 -5.5 -5.5 0.0 0.0   
1980-84  -7.0 -2.2 -8.5 -12.1 2.9 0.0   
1985-89  -6.7 -3.1 -7.5 -10.7 0.9 0.0   
1990-94  0.7 0.4 3.8 -4.6 5.7 0.0   
1995-99  0.5 1.2 5.3 -2.3 3.9 0.0   
2000-04  1.5 0.6 4.3 -3.3 5.4 0.0   
 




b Gross subsidy equivalents including product-specific input subsidies.  
 





Table 1.16: Relative rates of assistance to agriculture
a, Latin America countries, 1965 to 2004 
(percent)  
  1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Argentina          
NRA  Agriculture  -22.7 -22.9 -20.4 -19.3 -15.8  -7.0  -4.0 -14.9 
NRA  Non-Agric.  52.3 35.1 21.1 17.7 15.8 11.0 10.5  5.7 
RRA  -49.2 -43.0 -34.2 -31.5 -27.4 -16.2 -13.1 -19.7 
Brazil 
b          
NRA  Agriculture  -6.1 -27.3 -23.3 -25.7 -21.1 -11.3  8.0  4.1 
NRA  Non-Agric.  na 34.7 35.7 33.6 29.6  8.3  7.8  5.4 
RRA  na -46.1 -43.5 -44.4 -39.1 -17.9  0.2  -1.2 
Chile           
NRA  Agriculture  3.1 3.5 1.9 6.1  13.6 8.1 7.4 3.5 
NRA  Non-Agric.  26.1 32.1 11.2  7.2  9.0  5.9  5.3  2.3 
RRA  -18.0  -20.0 -8.0 -1.0  4.2  2.2  2.0  1.1 
Colombia           
NRA  Agriculture  -5.1 -17.8 -15.2  6.2  0.8  10.6  16.6  33.3 
NRA  Non-Agric.  28.1 24.4 18.9 23.7 23.5  9.6  7.9  7.1 
RRA  -25.6 -34.0 -28.7 -14.0 -18.4  1.3  8.1  24.5 
Dominican Rep.           
NRA  Agriculture  5.3 -18.2 -22.2 -31.4 -37.3  -1.0  9.7  2.8 
NRA  Non-Agric.  9.1  8.7 10.2 10.4 10.2  9.3  5.8  4.2 
RRA  -3.5 -24.8 -29.5 -37.9 -43.0  -9.4  3.6  -1.4 
Ecuador 
b          
NRA  Agriculture  -14.8 -31.5 -20.8  9.9  -0.8  -6.4  -2.6  11.2 
NRA  Non-Agric.  1.2  -3.2 4.8 9.4 8.6 2.5 5.8 8.5 
RRA  -15.8 -29.3 -24.5  0.3  -8.8  -8.8  -8.1  2.2 
Mexico           
NRA  Agriculture  na na na  3.9  3.0  31.2  4.2  11.8 
NRA  Non-Agric.  na na na  7.2  4.0  5.8  3.2  6.8 
RRA  na na na  -3.3  -1.1  24.1  1.0  4.7 
Nicaragua 
b          
NRA  Agriculture  na na na na na  -3.2  -11.3  -4.2 
NRA  Non-Agric.  na na na na na  7.1  6.1  5.7 
RRA  na na na na na  -9.6  -16.4  -9.4 
All LA studied countries (unweighted average) 
c  
NRA  Agriculture  -6.0 -19.0 -16.4  -7.2  -8.2  2.6  3.5  5.7 
NRA  Non-Agric.  16.8 20.6 15.6 14.3 13.4  7.7  7.3  6.5 
RRA  -19.5 -32.9 -27.7 -18.8 -19.1  -4.8  -3.5  -0.8 
All LA studied countries (weighted average) 
d  
NRA  Agriculture  -9.3 -23.0 -19.0 -12.9 -11.2  4.4  5.5  4.9 
NRA  Non-Agric.  15.9 27.8 23.3 18.5 16.8  7.3  6.6  5.5 
RRA  -21.4 -39.8 -34.2 -26.6 -24.0  -2.7  -1.0  -0.6 
Dispersion of national 
RRAs
e  17.0 12.7 13.6 20.6 19.1 14.0 10.3 13.4 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
b Ecuador and Brazil 1965-69 column refers to 1966-69 data; and Nicaragua 1990-94 column 
to 1991-94 data. 
c Simple averages of the above (weighted) national averages.  
d Weighted averages of the above national averages, using weights based on gross value of 
national agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
e Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the standard deviation around a weighted mean of 
the national agricultural sector NRAs each year. 





Table 1.17: Relative per capita income,
a agricultural comparative advantage index,
b and 















   
Argentina 89 541 -14.9 -19.7 
Brazil 54 355 4.1 -1.2 
Chile 86 386 5.8 1.1 
Colombia 35 264 25.9 24.5 
Dominican Rep.  41 474 2.5 -1.4 
Ecuador 33 487 10.1 2.2 
Mexico 112 64 11.6 4.7 
Nicaragua 14 952 -4.2 -9.4 
LA countries studied 
(unweighted average)  69 219 4.9 -0.8 
 
a Income per capita relative to the world average, 2000-04. (World=100) 
 
b Agriculture and food’s share of national exports as a percentage of agriculture and food’s 
share of global exports, 2000-04 
 
Source: Columns 1 and 2: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007); columns 3 and 4: 






Table 1.18: Relationships between nominal rates of assistance and some of its determinants, 




variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
              



























































































    -0.02* 
(0.01)      -0.05* 






   -0.04 
(0.03)      -0.20* 
(0.06)      -0.18* 
(0.06)   

























            
R
2  0.02 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.17 
No. of obs.  2564 2564 2314 2314 2564 2564 2314 2414 2564 2564 2314 2414 
Country FE  No No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE  No No No No No No No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
 
a Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in 
national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of global exports (world=1). 
 
b Net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food 
products (world=1). 
 
Notes: Dependent variable for regressions is NRA by commodity and year. Results are OLS 
estimates, with standard errors in parentheses and significance levels shown at the 99%(*). 
The main explanatory variable is ln GDP per capita in $10,000s.  
 





Table 1.19: Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of covered 
farm products,
a Latin American countries, 1965 to 2003 
(percent, at primary product level) 
(a) aggregate CTEs by country 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Argentina  -27.6 -27.2 -25.2 -23.4 -16.6  -5.7  0.0  -9.1 
Brazil  2.1 -25.4 -19.8 -25.8 -26.5 -23.1  -2.1  -1.3 
Chile  7.1  1.5  2.8  9.0 23.8 18.1 14.2 10.7 
Colombia  7.2  -13.4 -5.3 27.4 20.8 16.2 33.9 49.7 
Dominican  Rep.  12.9  -7.1  -7.7 -27.8 -31.4  7.8  16.6  3.5 
Ecuador  -10.5  -25.7  3.9 35.0 17.4 -3.3  4.6 18.5 
Mexico  na  na  na -1.3  0.8 22.3 -1.9  9.9 
Nicaragua  na na na na na  10.5  10.6  9.0 
LA countries studied: 
  Unweighted average
  -0.8  -16.2 -8.8 -1.0 -1.7  4.8  9.5 11.4 
  Weighted average
b  -4.7 -22.1 -16.2 -13.4 -12.3  -2.7  1.4  5.1 
  Dispersion of national 
CTEs
c  15.5 13.4 14.5 29.2 26.0 17.4 15.0 18.8 
 
(b) Regional CTEs by product 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Rice  30 8  -10 0 6 6  19  30 
Wheat  17  0 32 19  8 22  8 13 
Maize  -9  -4 -13 -11 -14  -4  -8  -4 
Other  grains  0  0 -6 -6 -5 -3  -15  -14 
Soybean  4  -5 -15 -13 -19 -10  -5  -9 
Other  oilseeds  0  0 -24 -22 -22 -10  -8 -17 
Sugar  28 -60 -44 -54 -41 -18  8  27 
Cotton  -6  -1 -14 -24 -23 -23  -7  7 
Coffee  -25 -26 -32 -52 -34  -7 -10  -4 
Cocoa  6 -16 -13  -4 -16 -16 -12  -7 
Fruit  &  veg  8  10 -12  1 -30 -16 -22 -17 
Beef  -27 -23 -14 -11  -6 -11  4  1 
Pigmeat  6 -14 -14 -26 -26  3  -3  4 
Poultry  110  132 98 26 18 17  7 21 
Egg  na  na -10  0  -6  2 -16 -17 
Milk  5 -3 18 70 54 38 28 44 
LA countries studied:          
  Weighted average
b  -4.7 -22.1 -16.2 -13.4 -12.3  -2.7  1.4  5.1 
  Dispersion of regional 
product CTEs
d  35.2 46.4 34.6 30.4 23.5 16.3 13.8 18.6 
a Assumes the CTE is the same as the NRA derived from trade measures (that is, not 
including any input taxes/subsidies or domestic producer price subsidies/taxes).  
 
b Weights are consumption valued at undistorted prices, where consumption (from FAO) is 
production plus imports net of exports plus change in stocks of the covered products. 
c Simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the 
national average CTE. 
d Simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the 
regional average CTE for the covered products shown above. 





Table 1.20: Value of consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of covered farm 
products, Latin American countries, 1965 to 2003 
 
(US$ million at primary product level) 
 
(a) aggregate CTEs by country 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Argentina  -232 -412 -591  -1060 -665 -263  -3 -781 
Brazil  23 -1721 -2014 -5393 -5032 -5183  -641  -297 
Chile  26  -7  22  83 170 220 233 151 
Colombia  47 -228 -106  715  518  571 1380 1469 
Dominican  Rep.  13  -34  -49 -165 -158  33  87  21 
Ecuador  -24  -64 20  199 98  -26 74  370 
Mexico  na  na  na -103  104 3483 -370 1934 
Nicaragua  na na na na na 35 51 50 
LA countries studied
  -146 -2490 -2713 -5726 -4960 -1140  812  2920 
All LA countries
a  -180 -3074 -3349 -7069 -6123 -1408  1003  3605 
 
(b) Regional CTEs by product
b 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-03 
Rice  27  -29 -232 -168  71  135  508  576 
Wheat  81  -122 409 561 171 654 264 407 
Maize  -64  -80 -450 -824 -919 -322 -749 -377 
Other  grains  0  -1 -57 -80 -75 -47  -239  -240 
Soybean  1  -36 -343 -463 -936 -431 -387 -882 
Other  oilseeds  0  0  -67 -100 -115  -62  -87 -113 
Sugar  23 -1895 -1684 -3485 -2066  -975  387  1149 
Cotton  -13  -3 -151 -260 -228 -259  -56  55 
Coffee  -19  -28 -116 -942 -365  -40  -82  -26 
Cocoa  0 -1 -3 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1 
Fruit  &  veg  11  23  -84  -81 -484 -424 -646 -420 
Beef  -217 -313 -336 -881 -443  -1332  588  70 
Pigmeat  1  -4  -60 -715 -636  105 -143  116 
Poultry  10  17 101 308 255 383 306 982 
Egg  na  na -52 -14 -66  20  -226  -313 
Milk  13  -18  246 1421  875 1455 1374 1941 
LA  countries  studied:  -146 -2491 -2879 -5724 -4962 -1142  813  2924 
a Assumes the rate of assistance to covered products in non-studied countries is the same as 
the average for the studied Latin American countries excluding Mexico, and that their share 
of the value of Latin American and Caribbean (excluding Mexican) agricultural production at 
undistorted prices is the same as their average share of the region’s agricultural GDP at 
distorted prices during 1990-2004, which was 23 percent. These dollar amounts do not 
include non-covered farm products, which amount to almost one-third of agricultural output 
(see last row of Table 1.10), nor any mark-up that might be applied along the value chain. 
b Mexico is included in the 5-year product averages for 1975-79: thus, the LA countries total 
is higher in absolute number than the LA countries total in part (a), which excludes Mexico in 
this period. 





Figure 1.1: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, individual Latin American countries
a 


















a There are no estimates for Nicaragua in 1980-84. 
 






Figure 1.2: Nominal rates of assistance, by product, Latin America countries, 1980-84 and 
2000-04 
(percent) 
(a) unweighted average across countries 



















a average across countries 


















a Weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices [each NRA 
(by country, by product) is weighted by the country’s value of production of that commodity 
in a given year]. Products with less than 1 percent of the gross value of regional production 
are excluded. These include: apples, cassava, cocoa, garlic, onions, palm oil, peanuts and 
sesame.  
 






Figure 1.3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
a agricultural 


















(b) weighted averages across eight countries  














a The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and importable averages because 
assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included. 
 







Figure 1.4: Nominal rates of assistance for covered farm products in total and from input 
price distortions,





















NRA inputs NRA total
 
 
a The total NRA for covered products is the sum of that due to output assistance, NRAo, and 
that due to measures affecting purchased farm inputs, NRAi, such that NRAo is the difference 
between the two curves shown. 
 






Figure 1.5: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, Latin American countries,
a 


















a There are no estimates for Nicaragua in 1975-79, and Mexico’s estimates in that period are 
for 1979 alone. 
 







Figure 1.6: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers in Latin America, by product, 
































Figure 1.7: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products 
and relative rate of assistance,
a Latin America region, 1965 to 2004 
 
 (percent)  
 







































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 





Figure 1.8: Relative rates of assistance to agriculture,
a Latin America countries and 



























t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
No data for Nicaragua in 1980-84. 
 





Figure 1.9: Nominal and relative rates of assistance,
a Asia, Africa and Latin America,
b 1965 
































a 5-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights.  
b NRAs (for 1965-80) and RRAs (for 1965-81) for China have been extrapolated back 
assuming they were the same as the average for years 1982-89. 
 






Figure 1.10: Income distribution, Latin America region and the world, 2000 
 
(a) Latin America region 
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Figure 1.11: Relationships between real GDP per capita, comparative advantage, and 
agricultural NRA and RRA,
a Latin America countries, 1955 to 2005   
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LAC NRA obs LAC fitted values
 
 
Coefficient Standard  error  R
2 
0.08 0.04 0.03 
 
















0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Ln real GDP per capita
LAC RRA obs LAC fitted values
 
 
Coefficient Standard  error  R
2 
0.19 0.04 0.01 
 
Notes: Dependent variable for regressions is NRA or RRA by country and year, expressed as 
a fraction. Results are OLS estimates. The explanatory variable is the natural log of real GDP 






Figure 1.11 (cont.): Relationships between real GDP per capita, comparative advantage, and 
agricultural NRA and RRA,
a Latin America countries, 1955 to 2005     
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RCA
LAC rra obs LAC fitted values
 
 
Coefficient Standard  error  R
2 
0.03 0.01 0.04 
a Dependent variable for regressions is NRA or RRA by country and year, expressed as a 
fraction. Results are OLS estimates. The explanatory variable revealed comparative 
advantage, which is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio 
of that sector’s share of global exports. 
Source: Based on NRA estimates in authors’ spreadsheets cited in Chapters 2-9 of this 
volume and on economic data in Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007).  